Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
3-1993

When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to
Their Will
Susan P. Koniak

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their Will , in 66 Southern
California Law Review 1075 (1993).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2130

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Sep 7 17:59:15 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to Their
Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (1993).
ALWD 7th ed.
Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to Their
Will, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1075 (1993).
APA 7th ed.
Koniak, S. P. (1993). When courts refuse to frame the law and others frame it to
their will. Southern California Law Review, 66(3), 1075-1114.
Chicago 17th ed.
Susan P. Koniak, "When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to Their
Will," Southern California Law Review 66, no. 3 (March 1993): 1075-1114
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Susan P. Koniak, "When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to Their
Will" (1993) 66:3 S Cal L Rev 1075.
AGLC 4th ed.
Susan P. Koniak, 'When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to Their
Will' (1993) 66(3) Southern California Law Review 1075
MLA 9th ed.
Koniak, Susan P. "When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to Their
Will." Southern California Law Review, vol. 66, no. 3, March 1993, pp. 1075-1114.
HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Susan P. Koniak, 'When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to Their
Will' (1993) 66 S Cal L Rev 1075
Provided by:
Fineman & Pappas Law Libraries
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

WHEN COURTS REFUSE TO FRAME
THE LAW AND OTHERS FRAME IT
TO THEIR WILL
SUSAN P. KONIAK*

Faith, I have been a truant in the law,
And never yet could frame my will to it
And therefore frame the law unto my will.
William Shakespeare, Henry VI pt. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler's settlement with the government,1 two versions of the story have emerged.
The most popular version features the government actors as villainsvillains with new and lethal weapons at their disposal, willing to enforce
law that has leapt full grown from their heads like Zeus' child, law of
which the rest of the civilized world was unaware. The counterstory,
less often told but not without adherents, casts the lawyers of Kaye,
Scholer as the villains: unscrupulous and greedy lawyers ready to break
any rule, defile any process, twist any truth on behalf of their even more
unscrupulous and greedy client.3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School. B.A. 1975, New York
University; J.D. 1978, Yale Law School.
1. See Introduction: Kaye, Scholer and the OTS-Did Anyone Go Too Far?, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 977 (1993).

2. See Accountability by Sledgehammer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at A24 (editorial decrying the government's coercive methods and questioning its "novel demands that the lawyers abandon their customary loyalty to clients"); Bill Atkinson, Weinstein of the OTS: Thrift Lawyers'
Nemesis, AM. BANKER, June 23, 1992, at 2 (quoting an ABA chairperson on the novelty of some of
the OTS' ethical interpretations and describing how the government brought Kaye, Scholer to its
"knees" with its asset freeze order); Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, The Banking Scandal.An
Era of New Standardsfor Professionals?,N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 1992, at 1, 18 (questioning the wisdom
of the oTs' position that "higher ethical duties" are owed to insured institutions and condemning
the "administrative absolutism" of the OTS' powers); Daniel Wise, OTS's "HardballTactic" Decried
by Bar, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10, 1992, at I (describing the near-universal belief among lawyers that Kaye,
Scholer was bullied into submission by the government).
3. See, eg., Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAW., May
1992, at 69 ("Kaye, Scholer is not a victim, except of its own arrogance in its overzealous, over-the-
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I find neither story terribly satisfying and will offer a third. My
story highlights the roles played by two institutions, the organized bar
and the courts, which are merely bit players in the stories told by others.
In the two standard stories, the bar shows up, if at all, as either a Greek
chorus lamenting the government's brutish tactics or an unknown force
offstage that may or may not be as bad as the crooked Kaye, Scholer
lawyers. 4 The audience is left to wonder. The courts appear only in a
dream sequence sometimes included in the government-as-villain tale. In
the dream, Kaye, Scholer fights back, and the judges, like white knights
in shining armor, step in to help defeat the evil empire and preserve
liberty.
My story asks you to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as central
characters, not because it might be amusing to do so, but because they
have earned that distinction. The bar and the courts deserve more blame
than they have thus far received.
II.

LAW THAT'S OLD FOR SOME AND NEW FOR OTHERS
Consider the following two quotations:
(1) The Notice of Charges [against Kaye, Scholer] rested on five principles of law and professional responsibility. Each of the five principles
is unremarkable and well established.5
(2) A lawyer who represented a Texas financial institution in 1985
cannot plausibly have foreseen that a FDIC/RTC/OTS policy maker
in Washington would decide to redefine his client from a thrift to a
quasi-government corporation which would impose wholly different
ethical responsibilities on the lawyer. That unfortunate lawyer was
faced with clear disciplinary rules that not only did not allow him to
subordinate his client's interests to that of the6 regulatory agencies, they
affirmatively prohibited him from doing so.

bounds pursuit of a crooked client's interests."); Steve France, Just Deserts: Don't Cry for Kaye,
Scholer, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at 2 (claiming that Kaye, Scholer successfully manipulated the
press into believing that the real story was government abuse rather than the lawyers' own questionable conduct).
4. See France, supra note 3, at 6 (concluding that "the question remains: just how unstinting
was Charles Keating's lawyer, and just how typical of his profession").
5. Harris Weinstein, OTS Chief Counsel, Address Before the Pennsylvania Ass'n of Community Bankers (Mar. 23, 1992), in ATTORNEYS' LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC'Y, THE KAYE, SCHOLER
CASE AND OTHER SELECTED PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND ETHICS ISSUES 133, 134 (Robert E.

O'Malley et al. eds., 1992).
6. John K. Villa, Emerging Theories of Liabilityfor Lending Counsel, in THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER 93, 156 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Hand-

book Series No. B4-7009, 1992) (commenting on the charges brought by the OTS against Kaye,
Scholer).
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The law embodied in the charges against Kaye, Scholer is either
"unremarkable and well established" or it is so novel as to have been
unforeseeable. It cannot be both. Or can it? It could be both well established in the government's view and unforeseeable to the bar if the government and the state do not share with the bar a vision of the law
governing lawyers-if there are essentially two laws governing lawyers,
the law articulated by the state and that embraced by the bar. Elsewhere,
I have argued that just such a state of affairs exists and that the two laws
diverge at critical points,7 most notably over the duty to disclose a client's wrongdoing-the underlying issue in the charges brought against
Kaye, Scholer.9
Here I argue that the courts, by allowing these two divergent laws to
flourish, and the bar, by insisting on living out its law in defiance of the
state's law, must share responsibility for any injustice visited on the lawyers of Kaye, Scholer and for the fear and uncertainty that the incident
7. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389
(1992). Throughout this Article, as in my earlier work, I speak of the bar's law and the bar's normative vision. By those terms I mean to refer to the dominant normative vision expressed by private
lawyers and their representative organizations. I do not mean to suggest that the bar is monolithic
or that only one vision of law exists, which all lawyers share. I understand that the vision I describe
as dominant is not shared by all lawyers and that substantial subgroups of lawyers may adhere to
another vision. Nonetheless, along with other scholars of the profession, I maintain that there is a
dominant normative vision shared by most lawyers in private practice, albeit with some variation.
See, e-g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1988) (describing
the shared normative vision adhered to by most lawyers as the "Liberal Advocacy Ideal"); Deborah
L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 595-605 (1985) (describing
the dominant vision as the adversary ideology).
8. Koniak, supra note 7, at 1427-47.
9. See In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19 (Dep't Treasury 1992) (Mar. 1 notice of charges against
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler and three partners), reprintedin KAYE, SCHOLER CASE,
supra note 5, at 3172. While the charges against Kaye, Scholer covered a number of specific matters,
the heart of the complaint was that the law firm breached its duty to disclose certain information
about its client to the government. Seven of the 10 claims brought against the firm involved failures
to disclose. See id. claims 2-3, 5-9. The OTS did not argue that lawyers have a general duty to
disclose adverse information; rather, it claimed that such a duty arose in this case for two reasons:
First, Kaye, Scholer had a duty to disclose information to avoid making materially misleading statements to the regulators. See, eg., id claims 2, 7-9. Second, by having taken on completely and
exclusively the role of agent reporting on the client's behalf to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
the firm assumed the client's duties of disclosure to the government auditors. See id. claim 3. The
government also claimed that Kaye, Scholer had a duty to disclose to the client's board of directors
information demonstrating wrongdoing on the part of the client's agent, Charles Keating, that could
have been imputed to the client and that the government had a right to assert this failure on the
client's behalf. See id. claim 4. The OTS also argued that Kaye, Scholer had a duty not to recklessly
advise its client by ignoring material facts and that a failure of this duty amounted to willfully aiding
a violation of the FHLBB regulations. See id, claim 1. Finally, the OTS claimed that Kaye,
Scholer's participation in obtaining a loan for a Kaye, Scholer partner from Lincoln Savings and
Loan violated the FHLBB regulations in that the loan was granted without appropriate documentation. See id. claim 10.
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has caused among members of the bar.' ° I also examine several ques-

tions that I have not addressed previously that are raised by my description of two conflicting laws: Is it right for the state to insist on a legal
vision without court approval? Is it right for the bar to buck the courts?
What is wrong with the bar's law on confidentiality?" But first, I review
my claim that the bar has a law of lawyering that diverges from state law,
and I examine what the courts and the bar did that led to such uncertainty about whose law reigns.
In general, the bar and the government agree on the relevant set of
precepts that govern a lawyer's conduct. 2 But to share a set of rules is
not to share one law. Every group that maintains a law must order the

various rules that make up that law-in other words, establish a hierarchy of norms-and must maintain narratives and interpretations of those

rules that explicate their breadth, justify and affirm their respective place
in the hierarchy, and identify what conduct in the material world implicates the various rules. If two groups order shared precepts differently or
maintain divergent interpretations of those precepts, they have different
laws. In the bar's hierarchy of norms, confidentiality trumps other
norms and is interpreted to be more or less absolute. 3 On the other
hand, the courts and other government agencies have long maintained a
10. See infra parts III & IV.
11. These questions are addressed infra part V. Several readers of my earlier work have
expressed their frustration with the brevity of my conclusion, in which I condoned the bar's having
its own law but condemned the law the bar has chosen, as I see that law. See Koniak, supra note 7,
at 1485-87. Having taken the time to read my perhaps overly lengthy brief for the proposition that
the bar and the state have different laws of lawyering, these readers were disappointed to find that at
the end I had not more clearly explored the normative implications of the state of affairs I had
described. I appreciate their patience and their curiosity, and I hope that this Article addresses their
concerns. I do, however, want to point out that while in one sense my earlier work is descriptive, the
description is itself a normative statement. By choosing to honor the law of private groups with the
title of "law," by refusing to reserve "law" for the state alone, I have staked out a normative position. It is a position that ennobles civil disobedience, that rejects the idolatry of treating as "right"
that which is "official" merely because it is "official," and that challenges each of us to justify the law
we call our own and the lives our law creates.
The true triumph of legal positivism lies in how the word "law" has become reserved in modern
times for pronouncements of the state. The word "law" has a long and rich history, much of which
belies the notion that law is only that which the sovereign speaks. Consider such usages as "natural
law," "religious law," "the law of the jungle," and even such colloquial expressions as "Murphy's
law." See Robert M. Cover, Folktalesof Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179, 18081 (1985). Notwithstanding that history, positivism's enduring legacy is that those who speak seriously about a law that is not the state's risk being understood as speaking metaphorically, or worse,
risk being understood as speaking nonsense. To those who read "bar law" or "group law" as nonsense, I ask only that they recognize that their position is as normative as I have frankly acknowledged my own to be.
12. Koniak, supra note 7, at 1410-11.
13. Id. at 1427-47.
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more narrow understanding of the duty of confidentiality.1 4 The courts

have suggested and government agencies have insisted"5 that laws of general application,16 the lawyer's duty to uphold the law, 17 and the lawyer's
duty not to assist a client engaged in lawbreaking may trump confidentiality.I8 In the Kaye, Scholer case, the bar's understanding and the state's
understanding clashed.
III. THE COURTS' ABDICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
The Kaye, Scholer case was not the first time the bar and state
actors had clashed over the duty to disclose client wrongdoing. In the
1970s and 1980s the bar and the SEC battled over a lawyer's duty to
disclose a client's securities fraud. That controversy reached the courts,
but the courts ducked. They refused to frame the law governing lawyers.

That refusal allowed the continuation of two divergent understandings of
a lawyer's responsibilities and paved the way for the Kaye, Scholer

controversy.
In 1972, the SEC charged several lawyers and their firms with aiding their clients' violations of the securities laws. According to the SEC,

these lawyers aided securities fraud by not stopping their clients from
14. For a comprehensive discussion of how the bar's understanding of confidentiality diverges
from state law, see Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to
Prevent Harm, 70 IowA L. Rav. 1091, 1106-57 (1985). Other commentators who contrast the
state's more limited view of confidentiality with the bar's expansive view include Wayne D. Brazil,
UnanticipatedClient Perjuryand the Collision of Rules ofEthics: Evidence and ConstitutionalLaw,
44 Mo. L. Rav. 601, 615-22 (1979); David J. Fried, Too High a Pricefor Truth: The Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilegefor Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REv. 443, 490-98
(1986); L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty ofLoyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 944-45
(1980).
15. I have chosen the verbs "suggested" and "insisted" with care. This difference between the
courts' attitude and the government's attitude is a critical part of my thesis and is explored infra part
III.
16. See, eg., United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that client identity and fees are not covered by the attorney-client privilege and rejecting the
bar's arguments that the lawyer's duty of confidentiality trumps the reporting requirements of the
Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the IRS regulations issued thereunder). This clash between the bar and
the state over the breadth of confidentiality is discussed in Koniak, supra note 7, at 1405-07.
17. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986) ("An attorney's duty of confidentiality which
totally covers the client's admission of guilt, does not extend to a client's announced plans to engage
in future criminal conduct."); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977)
(explaining that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege reflects the policy that the
lawyer's duty to uphold the law precedes and trumps the duty of confidentiality).
18. Nix, 475 U.S. at 174 ("A [client] who informed his counsel that he was [planning to commit a crime] would have no 'right' to insist on counsel's assistance or silence."); Hodge & Zweig, 548
F.2d at 1355 ("[A] quid pro quo is exacted for the attorney-client confidence: the client must not
abuse the confidential relation by using it to further a fraudulent or criminal scheme .... ").
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closing a merger deal that the lawyers discovered had been approved on
the basis of materially misleading documents, and by not disclosing their

clients' wrongdoing to the SEC or shareholders once the lawyers had
failed to thwart the deal. 9 The SEC sued for injunctive and declaratory

relief, asking the court to declare that under the securities laws the lawyers should have (1) insisted that their clients postpone the deal, revise
the documents, and resubmit them to the shareholders; (2) tried to

thwart the closing by refusing to issue their opinion letters; and (3)
resigned and disclosed the fraud to the shareholders or the SEC if their
efforts to thwart the merger through advice and persuasion failed.2'
The SEC's complaint implied a precept: A lawyer who knows that a
client is committing securities fraud must stop the client and, failing that,

must disclose. The ethics code then in existence, drafted and endorsed
by the ABA, included just such a precept. 21 But the bar had long maintained that this precept was trumped by the lawyer's duty of confidentiality. 22 The SEC suggested that the hierarchy was different. According to
the SEC, the duty to prevent client fraud in which the lawyer's services
were used trumped the duty of confidentiality when necessary to stop the
fraud.23
On the surface, the district court in SEC v. NationalStudent Marketing sided with the SEC. It held that the lawyers had violated the
19. Complaint, SEC v. NationalStudent Mktg. Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) %93,360 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972). The decision in the case appears at 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978).
20. Id.
21.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969) ("A lawyer who

receives information clearly establishing that... [h]is client has in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.")
22. See, eg., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1945),
interpreting the predecessor to the Model Code, the CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS (1953):
We do not consider that either the duty of candor and fairness to the court, as stated in
Canon 22, or the provisions of Canon 29 [requiring disclosure of pejury] or Canon 41
[requiring disclosure of fraud to the injured party or the tribunal] . . . are sufficient to
override the purpose, policy and express obligation [to keep client confidences] under
Canon 37.
Other ethics opinions issued long before the complaint was filed in National Student Marketing
echoed this view that confidentiality trumps the rules requiring disclosure of a client's fraud or
intended crime. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. C-778 (1964); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 258 (1945); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 216 (1941); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 202 (1940). See generally Koniak, supranote 7, at 1431-41 (discussing the bar's elevation of
the norm of confidentiality over other norms).
23. National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 682.
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securities laws by knowingly and substantially assisting their clients to
commit fraud, and that lawyers assisting in securities transactions could
not sit by silently while their clients committed fraud.24 The court
explained that silence or inaction in such a situation is wrong because
lawyers have a duty "to their corporate client[s] .. .to take steps to
ensure that the information [will] be disclosed to the shareholders."2 5
What steps? There's the rub.
The court refused to say with any precision what the lawyers did in
this case that was an affront to the securities laws or what lawyers should
do in the future to fulfill their obligations: "[lIt is unnecessary to determine the precise extent of their obligations here, since ... they took no
steps whatsoever to delay the closing .... But, at the very least, they
were required to speak out [to their clients] at the closing... ."26 Should
the lawyers have resigned? Disclosed the fraud to officers of the corporate clients who were not present at the meeting? Informed shareholders
or the SEC? The SEC complaint raised these questions, and their resolution was relevant to the relief requested. As the court itself stated, in
deciding whether to grant injunctive relief a court must consider how
badly the defendant has behaved.27 In what sense, then, was it "unnecessary" to examine the extent to which the defendants' conduct fell short of
their obligations?
Faced with a confrontation between the bar and the state, the court
ducked its institutional role of killing one of two competing visions of
law. The words "at the very least" suggest that a lawyer's obligations
when faced with a client committing fraud may include disclosure, but
the court refused to commit itself to that position or to reject it. Instead,
it invited the bar to rethink its position: "The very initiation of this
action.., has provided a necessary and worthwhile impetus for the profession's recognition and assessment of its responsibilities in this area." 2 8
This part of the court's opinion is troubling for two reasons. First, it
suggests that the bar has the right to define for itself what constitutes
aiding and abetting securities fraud, a troublesome proposition given the
public interests at stake and the bar's penchant for protecting clients at
the expense of all others. Second, and even more troubling, the court
asked the bar to rethink its obligations in the shadow of state violence.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

713, 715.
713.
715.
714.
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While the court refused to endorse the interpretation of law put forth in
the SEC's complaint, it applauded the complaint's power to coerce the
bar to change its understanding of its law:
By telling a community that it should reconsider its behavior and
beliefs in light of state power whether or not the use of that power is
legitimate, a court abandons its commitment to a state built on the
meaning of shared principles and helps constitute a state built on obedience to authority.2 9
Only in a police state should we expect a court to applaud the use of state
power to coerce people to change their ways regardless of the legitimacy
of the state's interpretation. By condoning the SEC's threat and inviting
the bar to reconsider its law, the court abdicated its institutional role as
authoritative interpreter of law.30 Instead, it invited state actors to use
state power to coerce changes in lawyers' attitudes-the precise criticism
many raise of the Office of Thrift Supervision's action in the Kaye,
Scholer case. What those who criticize the OTS are missing is how the
courts, before Congress granted the power to freeze assets, had
encouraged coercive action regardless of its legitimacy.
The district court's reluctance to create legal meaning in National
Student Marketing and its approval of the use of state power apart from
its legitimacy do not exhaust what we can learn from that case about the
judiciary's responsibility in the present conflict between the bar and the
state. There is a third move in National Student Marketing that is
instructive. The court, having found that the lawyers aided securities
fraud, took no action against them.3 1 The court thus refused to back
with power the little legal meaning it did affirm-that lawyers must not
just sit there. This refusal is particularly striking in light of the court's
approval of the SEC's use of power to coerce the bar to change its ways.
29. Koniak, supra note 7, at 1465.
30. It is a basic premise of all court decisions that judicial interpretations of state law trump
private interpretations. An extreme instance of this claim is made in Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307 (1967). Walker holds that a judicial interpretation of the Constitution trumps a private
interpretation even if a more authoritative court later states that the initial court decision was wrong.
Id. at 320-21. State doctrine in this country also provides that judicial interpretations trump interpretations of other state institutions or actors, although in some circumstances the decisions of some
state actors are entitled to more deference from the courts than the decisions of other state actors.
See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984) (stating that, within the agency's special expertise, courts should defer to an administrative
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statutory term).
31. NationalStudent Marketing,457 F. Supp. at 716 (refusing the SEC's request for injunctive
relief).
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The court was determined to stay out of the fight, leaving the bar and the
state to slug it out without an effective referee.3 2

To justify its refusal to sanction the lawyers, the court expressed its
confidence that the defendants' "professional responsibilities as attorneys
and officers of the court" would lead them to honor the court's interpretation without force. 33 The court's confidence in the lawyers before it,

and by extension in all lawyers, rings hollow. According to the court,
the lawyers before it aided securities fraud, and the bar needed the SEC's
threat of force to mend its ways. On the other hand, according to the
court, the court need not back its interpretation with force because law-

yers, members of the bar, are involved. The court seems to have been
determined to perpetrate the myth that lawyers, unlike the rest of the

populace, are so committed to the law (at least as articulated by courts)
that no power is needed to ensure the legal community's obedience. At
the same time, the court seems to have been all too aware that this is a
myth-a myth that might be shattered if courts articulated with any precision what a lawyer must do instead of just sitting there. Rather than
test the myth and risk shattering it, the court abdicated its responsibility,
leaving the state and the bar to battle over the shape of law.3 4
The court's refusal to sanction the lawyers in NationalStudent Marketing leaves the entire opinion subject to the charge that it is merely
advisory-a particularly potent charge here. Recall that the court justified its refusal to create legal meaning with an allusion to the rule against
rendering advisory opinions. I refer here to the "it is unnecessary to
32. "Among warring sects [here the SEC and the bar], each of which wraps itself in the mantle
of a law of its own, [judges] assert a regulative function that permits a life of law rather than violence." Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4, 53 (1983). They do this by asserting that one vision is law and the other is not,
attempting to kill the version they exile. "Theirs is the jurispathic office." Id.
33. NationalStudent Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 716.
34. It has been suggested that I undervalue the diplomacy of the court's resolution in National
Student Marketing. However, this critique was offered prior to the OTS action against Kaye,
Scholer. Nonetheless, some might still argue that the decision in that case was an attempt at diplomatic resolution, a peaceful effort by a court to encourage two parties to resolve their differences
amicably. Diplomacy it may be. However, it is a diplomacy that deserts the judiciary's institutional
function: resolving differing visions of what the law is that have risen to the level of actual conflict
and involve the threat of coercive force. Moreover, as the Kaye, Scholer incident makes all too
plain, it is a diplomacy that failed. Indeed, the court's resolution does not seem to have had much
effect on the conduct of the lawyers before it. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?,
105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 870-71 (1992) ("[A]ccording to the deposition testimony of the... managing partner [of the law firm defendant], the firm changed virtually none of its practices as a result of
the SEC's prosecutions in National Student Marketing.") (citing Tim O'Brien, Some Firms Never
Learn: Lord Bissell's Second Escapefrom Fraud Charges Cost $24 Million-And It Could Happen
Again, AM. LAW., Oct. 1989, at 63, 64).
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determine" language quoted earlier. 35 In the end, however, the rule
against advisory opinions did not stop the court from rendering advice; it
merely made the advice vague. Indeed, the advice on what a lawyer
should do is so vague as to be useless. There was, however, other advice
being offered: Tread carefully; the state is dangerous; do not count on the
courts to protect you.
Law is power restrained by and in the service of principle.3 6 The
opinion in National Student Marketing does not speak law; it defers to
power. The court in National Student Marketing conceded its role as
authoritative interpreter of law to the state, to the bar-to whomever
happened to win the struggle. It abdicated its authority, and by abdicating it invited state threats, bar resistance, and uncertainty about which
law reigns.
Because of the widespread attention the complaint and decision in
NationalStudent Marketing received, it is a particularly important example of the courts' historical reluctance to interfere in struggles between
the bar and the state. It is not, however, an isolated example. 37 It is
symptomatic of a phenomenon that has only recently begun to change.38
Consider Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt.3" In Barker,
the court sided with the bar rather than the state, but with as little commitment to its role as the NationalStudent Marketing court, or nearly as
little.
In Barker, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
returned to the question of whether a lawyer should disclose a client's
securities fraud. It held that the law firm in question was not liable for
aiding and abetting its client's fraud.' The court first concentrated on
the lack of scienter. It held that the district court was correct in granting
summary judgment for the law firm because there was no evidence that
35. See supra text accompanying note 26.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 129-30.
37. See Koniak, supra note 7, at 1474 nn.369-72 (citing examples).
38. See id. at 1476-77 (discussing the trend toward stronger commitment).
The Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975),
holding that activities of a mandatory bar association are not exempt from the antitrust
laws, may be one of the first and most significant signs of an increased commitment to the
role of state law vis-a-vis the profession. Another important sign is the significant erosion
in the traditional rule that a lack of privity prevents third parties from suing lawyers for
negligence.
The 1983 amendment of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
adoption of similar rules in the states may be another sign of the courts' increased commitment to its vision of lawyering.
Id. at 1477 n.379 (citations omitted).
39. 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
40. Id. at 497.
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the firm had acted with intent to deceive or in recidess disregard of a
fraud of which it should have been aware: "The securities laws do not
impose liability for ordinary malpractice... ,41 Had the court stopped
here, the decision would have been solid, if unremarkable. But the court
went on. The court held that, in addition to lacking scienter, the firm
had not provided substantial assistance to the fraud. Substantial assistance is another element necessary for liability for aiding securities fraud,
but its consideration was unnecessary to the court's decision given the
court's holding on scienter. Apparently the court had something it
wanted to say. It asserted:
The district court also held that the [law firm] had not committed any
forbidden act, had not participated in a scheme to defraud, by remaining silent when there was no duty to speak.... Neither lawyers nor
accountants are required to tattle on their clients in the absence of
some duty to disclose .... To the contrary, attorneys have privileges
not to disclose.4 2
On the surface, this sounds like approval of the bar's position on
nondisclosure, but this reading is deceptive. The law firm in Barker was
not the firm responsible for reviewing the documents used to sell the
securities in question, its name did not appear on any documents used to
sell securities, and it had advised the client to get a securities law firm to
review the relevant documents and ensure compliance with securities
law, which the client did.4" Given that the law firm in Barker was only
tangentially involved in the securities transaction at issue,' the court's
statement that the lawyers owed no duty to disclose a fraud also seems
unremarkable, particularly because the court had found no evidence that
the lawyers knew about the fraud.4" But in discussing the question of
substantial assistance, the court did not concentrate on how tangentially
involved the Barker lawyers were; indeed, the court did not mention that
41.

Id. at 496.

42. Id. at 497.
43. The securities law firm retained by the client was sued by the same plaintiffs that sued the
law firm in Barker. American Home Assurance Co. v. Dykeman, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow &
Trigg, 811 F.2d 1077, 1078 (7th Cir. 1987). That law firm settled, paying $612,500 for aiding its
client's securities fraud. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF LAWYERING 129 (1990). Apparently that law firm and its insurance company understood that the firm's silence about the client's fraud, combined with its knowledge and responsibilities, was enough of a problem under existing law to warrant settling.
44. The law firm's role was basically confined to organizing under state law the entity that later
sold the securities and helping that entity purchase the land in which secured interests were later
sold. Id. at 492-93.
45. Barker, 797 F.2d at 495-96.
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at all.46 Instead, it spoke in broad terms, appearing to reject "tattling" in
general and to affirm the strength of privileges. What was the court up
to? The court's concluding paragraph provides the answer:
The extent to which lawyers and accountants should reveal their
clients' wrongdoing-and to whom they should reveal-is a question
of great moment. There are proposals to change the rules of legal ethics and the SEC's regulations governing accountants. The professions
and the regulatory agencies will debate questions raised by cases such
as this one for years to come. We express no opinion on whether the
[law firm and the accounting firm in the Barker case] did what they
should, whether there was malpractice under state law, or whether the
rules of ethics (or other fiduciary doctrines) ought to require lawyers
and accountants to blow the whistle in equivalent circumstances. We
are satisfied, however, that an award of damages under the securities
laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward improved ethical standards in the legal and accounting professions. Liability depends on an
existing duty to disclose. The securities law therefore must lag behind
changes in ethical and fiduciary standards. The plaintiffs have not
pointed to any rule imposing on either Firm a duty to blow the
whistle. 47
This paragraph is reminiscent of the court's moves in NationalStudent Marketing: ceding power simultaneously to both the bar and the
state to determine what constitutes aiding securities fraud. The court
suggests that ethical standards could provide the "existing duty to disclose" that would render nondisclosure "substantial assistance" of securities fraud. It suggests, in other words, that an ethical standard requiring
lawyers to disclose fraud would render lawyers liable for aiding securities
fraud if they failed to disclose known client fraud.4" Hinging securities
liability on an ethical standard cedes power to the bar and the SEC
because the bar drafts the profession's ethics rules and has substantial
influence over the rules actually adopted as law by the states, and the
SEC has the power under its rule 2(e)49 to bring cases against lawyers for
46. The language quoted in the text is the court's entire discussion of assistance, omitting only
the court's case citations.
47. Barker, 797 F.2d at 497.
48. In Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 492 (4th Cir. 1991), the court refused to hinge a
lawyer's liability for securities fraud or other fraud on a state's ethics rules. In Schatz, the court took
responsibility for articulating the law and sided with the bar, strongly rejecting legal and policy
arguments for imposing a legal duty on lawyers to reveal client fraud. Id. I believe the decision in
Schatz is misguided, not because the court showed the sort of weak commitment I see in National
Student Marketing and Barker, but because the court took the wrong position, a position that I
argue later in this Article is essentially unfaithful to law. See infra text accompanying notes 152-56.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (1990).
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unprofessional conduct and to promulgate standards for professional
conduct." Given the enforcement powers available to the SEC, the

court's failure to assert its power to decide the controversy does not
mean that the bar will be free of coercion by the state's agents; it means
that the coercion will have to proceed without court approval of the law
invoked by the state.
In Barker the court admitted the importance of the question it left
the bar and the state to resolve. However, it did not admit the reality of
the power available to the SEC-power that makes this "debate" one

conducted in the shadow of the state's force. Moreover, its suggestion
that ethical standards should determine what constitutes securities fraud
seems strained, to say the least."

In NationalStudent Marketing the court aligned itself with the government's vision of law in name only, refusing to actually endorse that
position or back its own weak interpretation with force. In Barker, the
court aligned itself with the bar's vision of law but also in name only; it
did not insist that the state refrain from using force in the "debate."

A court may demonstrate commitment to its institutional role as
authoritative interpreter of state law by declaring that, as a matter of
state law, state law does not trump a group's norms. 2 Consider the
strong commitment to both the First Amendment and the court's own
power demonstrated in cases affirming the principle of religious freedom
from state interference.53 But the court in Barker did not say that the
50. The SEC has used rule 2(e) proceedings to announce standards of conduct applicable to the
legal profession. See, eg., In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981); In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange
Act Release No. 15,982, [1979 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124 (July 2, 1979).
The effort to enunciate standards in Carter was severely criticized by the bar and other commentators. See, eg., Comments to SEC Zero In on Agency Authority, 68 A.B.A. J. 252 (1982). Thereafter,
the SEC backed off. See Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(e): Securities and
Exchange Commission Discipline of Professionals,85 Nw. U. L. REv. 652, 664-66 (1991) (describing
how the SEC has refrained from enunciating standards to guide the legal profession since the furor
generated by Carter). Recently, however, the SEC has indicated its intention to once again take on
the bar by vigorously enforcing the securities laws against lawyers. See In re Kern, Exchange Act
Release No. 29,356, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815 (June 21, 1991)
(announcing the SEC's intention to renew efforts to discipline securities lawyers who "cause" or help
their clients violate the securities laws.)
51. See Schatz, 943 F.2d at 492 (rejecting the idea that an ethical duty to disclose creates a
legal duty).
52. Koniak, supra note 7, at 1463-64.
53. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). In Yoder the Supreme Court held
that the First and Fourteenth amendments prevented a state from compelling Amish parents to send
their children to high school. The Court employed a boundary rule of state law and interpreted the

rule's shape and scope.
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disclosure question was for the bar to determine free of state power. The
court said that the question was for the bar and state actors to fight
over-and that the courts should stay out of the fray. This is the move
that I am challenging, the move I claim demonstrates the courts' complicity in the present state of affairs.
The attitude of the courts, however, appears to be changing. For
example, in 1991 the Seventh Circuit again addressed the question of a
lawyer's liability for failing to disclose material information about a client. This time the court spoke with authority. In Ackerman v.
Schwartz,5 4 the court made clear that whether a duty to disclose exists in
securities cases depends not on the ethics rules or the SEC's self-promulgated rules but on the court's interpretation of the securities laws and the
laws of the relevant state. 55 It asserted that courts have the power to
control the dispute. Moreover, the court articulated the law. It asserted
that confidentiality must yield when a lawyer discovers, after issuing an
opinion letter that the lawyer knows will be included with other offering
documents disseminated to third parties, that statements made in that
opinion are materially misleading.56 The securities laws demand it."
The court also asserted that a lawyer may be liable for securities fraud
for issuing a materially misleading letter, opinion, or other statement not
included in the offering documents. The lawyer will be liable for statements made with reckless disregard for the truth whenever the lawyer
knows those statements will be disseminated to buyers.5" Thus, a lawyer
who takes the client's word on the facts and restates those facts to others
must withdraw those statements (essentially disclosing the fraud) as soon
as the lawyer discovers the fraud in order to minimize the lawyer's liability. In other words, confidentiality must yield. Finally, the Ackerman
court held that state tort law controls whether a lawyer may have a duty
to disclose information to correct statements negligently made by the
54. 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991).
55. Id. at 846 ("Federal law requires persons to tell the truth about material facts once they
commence speaking, but with rare exceptions does not oblige them to start speaking. The duty to
speak comes from a fiduciary relation established by state law.")
56. Id. at 848-49.
If... [the lawyer] authorized the inclusion of the letter with the offering documents, then
... [t]he duty to correct statements so long as the offering continues snaps into place.
Offering materials must be correct and non-misleading at the time of the sale, and not just
as of the time they were written.... This duty comes from federal securities law rather
than state law. [And i]f... [the lawyer] came to doubt the representations in his letter but
continued to allow its circulation, this may be powerful evidence of recklessness, and so
establish [principal] liability under § 10b and Rule lOb-5.
Id. at 848 (citation omitted).
57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 847-48.
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lawyer upon which others relied. 9 Under Ackerman, the lawyer's obligations are spelled out by the court as a matter of securities law and state
tort law. The court took responsibility for articulating the law governing
lawyers. It stepped into the fray. It acted like a court.
Most of the proposals for reform put forth in the wake of the Kaye,
Scholer incident call for prior judicial approval of cease-and-desist orders
issued by regulatory agencies." The lesson to be learned from the foregoing discussion of court behavior is that such reforms may offer lawyers
less protection from the government's brute force than the proponents of
such reforms imagine. Reforms that call for more judicial supervision
will work only to the extent that courts take responsibility and stand
between the state's use of force and a community's different vision of
what's right. By "standing between" I do not mean that the courts must
affirm the bar's position over the state's or vice versa. I mean that the
courts must be willing to affirm the legitimacy of one vision or the other.
Consider, for example, another problem facing banking lawyers
today: the breadth of potential liability under the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act. 6 ' Under FIRREA, lawyers
representing federally insured financial institutions who knowingly or
recklessly participate in "any unsafe or unsound practice, which caused
or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial loss to, or significant
adverse effect on, the insured credit union" are liable.62 Lawyers who
knowingly or recklessly participate in any violation of any law, regulation, or breach of fiduciary duty are also liable.6" These provisions are
quite broad, particularly the provision on "any unsafe or unsound practice." Lawyers will undoubtedly continue to lobby Congress to narrow
these phrases, but for now-and until Congress changes this languagethe bar must depend on the courts to construe these phrases with some
59. Id. at 846 (holding that Indiana state law renders lawyers liable for negligently made misrepresentations only if they authorized release of their statements to the investors' advisers).
60.

See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF

THE CITY OF NEw YORK, ATTACHMENT OF LAW FIRM ASSETS BY FEDERAL REGULATORY

AGENCIES (1992) [hereinafter ABCNY REPORT ON ATTACHMENT] (recommending that 12

U.S.C.

§ 1818 be amended to require prior judicial approval of temporary freeze orders at an ex parte
hearing); John C. Coffee, Jr., Due Processfor Kaye, Scholer?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at 22
(arguing that courts should interpret the Due Process Clause to require states to grant law firms (and
others) a hearing prior to issuing a freeze order that may threaten the defendant with insolvency).
61. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. I
1989)).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1786 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
63. Id.
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precision or nullify the law as void for vagueness." To narrow a law is to
kill off the state's broader pretensions about what the law means. To
declare a law void for vagueness is to say to the state that a law so indefinite that state officials can contend that it means almost anything is not
law. It is the threat of arbitrary force masquerading as law.6 5
When a court narrows a law or holds it void for vagueness, the court
demonstrates commitment to its institutional role of speaking law in the

face of conflicting visions. In our society, the institutional role of the
courts is to kill off some visions of law to end what otherwise would be
endless conflict about what the law means. 66 The question is whether the
courts will fill this role when the bar and the state do battle.
Judges "usually act and speak from the starting assumption that...

their vision [of law] is primary: they assume that their interpretations are
uniquely authoritative and that other interpretations must yield to
[judges']." 6 7 This starting assumption is often missing in cases involving
the law governing lawyers. While recent cases suggest that courts are
acting more responsibly in decisions on the law governing lawyers,68 old
habits die hard.69 If proposals to increase court supervision of disputes
64. The courts have held that "unsafe and unsound" is not an unconstitutionally vague term in
the context of regulating banks. See, e.g., Fahey v. Malonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (stating that
the term is "regulatory" and does not apply to "varied industries" but rather to "a single type of
enterprise and with the problems of insecurity and mismanagement which are as old as banking
enterprise"); Farmers State Bank v. Bernau, 433 N.W.2d 734, 741 (Iowa 1988) (stating that the term
is not so vague as to amount to "secret law"). These decisions, however, were based on assumptions
that may no longer be valid. For example, Professor Lawrence G. Baxter has criticized these decisions on the ground that "[tlhe concept of safety and soundness, except where it is explicitly defined
by statute or rule, is hardly likely to be 'generally understood' in the diverse world of modem financial services." Lawrence G. Baxter, Judicial Responses to the Recent Enforcement Activities of the
FederalBanking Regulators, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 193, 229 (1991). More important for our purposes, the use of this term to regulate the conduct of lawyers undercuts the assumptions of the
opinions upholding the term against charges of vagueness.
65. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (declaring that life, liberty, and property
must not be taken by a law whose terms are so "vague, indefinite and uncertain" that one cannot
determine their meaning).
66. Cover, supra note 32, at 53.
67. Koniak, supra note 7, at 1391-92.
68. For a very recent decision in which a court took responsibility for articulating the law
governing lawyers, see In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 1424, 1452 (D. Ariz. 1992) (rejecting Jones Day's motion for summary judgment in an action
against the firm by investors who were defrauded by one of the law firm's clients, Lincoln Savings
and Loan). The court stated, "The line between maintaining a client's confidences and violating the
securities law is brighter than Jones Day suggests." Id. at 1452.
69. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Reyes-Requena), 926 F.2d 1423 (5th Cir. 1991). In
that case the court refused to say whether and when a trial court should grant a hearing to determine
if a lawyer refusing to answer questions before a grand jury has a valid claim of attorney-client
privilege. Id. at 1433. The court held that the question was moot because the court had ultimately
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between agencies like the OTS and the bar are to succeed, the courts
must fulfill their institutional role; the starting assumption must be
restored.7 °
IV. THE BAR LIVING AND DYING BY THE SWORD
The version of the Kaye, Scholer story that lawyers prefer emphasizes the threat to liberty posed by a government willing to impose its
vision of law (of "right") by force without court approval or authority.
Critics fear that the OTS' power to freeze a defendant's assets without
prior court approval allows that agency to insist, through sheer force, on
a vision of law unratified by any court. 7 '
This is a powerful critique. As most who make it recognize, however, it is more appropriately aimed at Congress for authorizing the procedures used here72 and at the courts for approving similar procedures in
other contexts 73 than at OTS officials for using them. As long as such
upheld the lawyer's claim. Id. at 1425. But before granting a hearing and upholding the claim, the
trial court had summarily denied the claim on several occasions and had granted several government
motions to compel the lawyer to testify. Id. at 1427-28. In light of the contest of wills that the trial
court indulged for so long before granting a hearing and deciding the legal question, the appellate
court's resort to the mootness doctrine seems inappropriate. The appellate court refused to create
legal meaning and thus invited other battles of will.
70. See supra note 3. At least two aspects of the Kaye, Scholer case raise the specter of state
actors using the vision of right asserted by those state actors: (1) the OTS' power to issue a freeze
order without prior court approval, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (Supp. III 1991), and (2) the agency's power
to decide in the first instance whether the charges it has brought are valid, id.
On the latter point, had the charges against Kaye, Scholer been tried, the proceeding would
have been before an administrative law judge. Moreover, the administrative judge would have been
authorized to make only a recommendation to the director of the agency, who would have had the
power to reject or accept the recommendation after reviewing the record. The director's decision
would then have been appealable to a court.
This concentration of power is commonplace in administrative agencies, although in most agencies the final decision maker is a commission of people rather than one person. Commonplace or
not, such procedures are open to the charge that in operation they allow state actors to transform
their vision of "right" into law without court authority. I return to this question later. See infra text
accompanying notes 131-34.
For now, however, given that such procedures are commonplace and that most of the criticism
of the OTS has centered on the freeze order, the reader should understand my references in the text
to government without court approval as referring to the coercive force of the government's power
to freeze assets. When I return to the more commonplace powers of the government that might be
coercive, I make the change of focus clear in the text.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 129-31.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (Supp. III 1989) (giving the OTS the power to issue cease-and-desist
orders without prior court authorization).
73. In United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), the Supreme Court upheld a statute
that allowed a court, upon a finding of probable cause, to issue a pretrial order freezing the defendant's assets without exempting money necessary to pay an attorney. Id. at 614-15. The Court,
however, refrained from deciding whether the Due Process Clause requires a hearing before the
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government power exists, it is a threat. A state actor's refusal to use the
power attenuates the threat; it does not eliminate it. Thus far I have
suggested that the courts bear a special responsibility for this threat
against lawyers because the courts have for too long refused to play their
institutional role in this area of law. Now I want to concentrate on a
different problem: the bar's insistence on law without court approval or

authority. My claim is that the tyranny-by-force critique rings hollow
when made by an institution, the organized bar, that has flouted and
bypassed court attempts to articulate the law governing lawyers, that has

used its own power to insist on a law that diverges from the "official" law
articulated by the courts, and that now finds itself threatened by a state

of affairs it helped create.
Consider what the bar did when faced with the SEC's complaint in
National Student Marketing. While the case was pending, the ABA

adopted a policy recommendation from the ABA's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, the voice of the securities bar within the
imposition of such an order and whether the order could issue upon the government's ex parte
application. Id. at 615 n.10. The Court did, however, reject the argument that pretrial forfeiture of
attorney's fees offended the Due Process Clause by giving the government an unfair advantage over
the accused. Id. at 614-15 (relying on the Court's same-day decision in Caplin & Drysdale v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989), which held that postconviction forfeiture of assets could constitutionally
include attorney's fees). In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court acknowledged that granting the government power to deny the defendant money to pay a lawyer was a procedure "subject to abuse" but
refused to deny the government the tool. 491 U.S. at 634-35. "Cases involving particular abuses can
be dealt with individually by the lower courts, when (and if)
any such cases arise." Id. at 635.
On remand in Monsanto, the Second Circuit held that a court could issue a freeze order upon
the government's ex parte application, but that the Fifth and Sixth amendments require an adversarial, postrestraint pretrial hearing to confirm that probable cause exists to justify the freeze orderprobable cause that the defendant committed the crimes and probable cause that the properties
specified would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction. United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186,
1203 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Supreme Court's silence on the ex parte, pretrial judicial freeze order and the Second Circuit's approval of this procedure, albeit with the caveat that an adversary hearing be held before
trial, were soon extended by other courts. For example, both the Fifth and the Ninth circuits have
approved OTS' power to issue temporary freeze orders, ex parte, pretrial, and without prior judicial
approval. See Parker v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1991); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th
Cir. 1991). This is the procedure the OTS used against Kaye, Scholer. One difference is that the
defendants in Parker and Spiegel were not lawyers. Some argue that this difference is important
because while it may be reasonable to trust the OTS to spot wrongdoing by principals, for example,
bank managers, it is less reasonable to trust the OTS to spot wrongdoing by "secondary participants," like attorneys and accountants. See Coffee, supra note 60.
Professor Coffee also argues that Spiegel is undercut by the Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (1991), which was decided four months before Spiegel but may
not have been considered by the Spiegel court. Coffee, supranote 60, at 22. Doehr invalidated a state
law that permitted prejudgment attachment of a defendant's assets without a hearing upon an affidavit by the plaintiff that demonstrated "probable cause." 111 S.Ct. at 2116. Parker,decided after
Coffee's article appeared, also ignored Doehr.
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ABA.74 The recommendation maintained that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility controlled the question raised by the SEC complaint75 and that the Code, as interpreted by the bar, whose
interpretation was put forth as authoritative, neither permitted nor
obliged a lawyer to disclose to the SEC confidential information.7 6 Disclosure, according to the ABA, would contravene the "confidentiality of
lawyer-client consultations and advice and the fiduciary loyalty of the
lawyer to the client" prescribed by the Code.77 At the time this recommendation was adopted, the Code, both as drafted by the ABA7" and as
adopted by the state courts,7 9 contained the following provision:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that.. . [h]is
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the
fraud to the affected person or tribunal.80
On its face this provision authorizes disclosure to the shareholders,
if not the SEC, in a case like NationalStudent Marketing. The bar had,
however, long understood any such duty of disclosure to be trumped by
the duty of confidentiality."' In other words, notwithstanding the language adopted as law by the states, the bar embraced an ethic that did
not include such a duty of disclosure. Further, faced with state action by
the SEC that seemed to track the language of the law as adopted by the
states, the bar reaffirmed its contrary understanding.
74. ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising
with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in 61 A.B.A. J. 1085 (1975) [hereinafter ABA Policy on Securities Matters].

75. "Public policy, we strongly believe, is best served by lawyers acting in conformance with
their obligation to their client[s] and others as prescribed under the [Model Code]. Accordingly,

liability should not be imposed upon lawyers whose conduct is in conformance with the [Model
Code]." Id. at 1086.
76. Id.

77. Id.
78. The preliminary draft of the Model Code did not include the provision quoted in the text
on disclosing client fraud, although the predecessor to the Code contained such a provision. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (noting that the
draft did not contain this provision); CANONS OP PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 41 (1937) (requiring
a lawyer to rectify client fraud after the fraud is discovered, first by remonstrating with the client
and, if that fails, by disclosing). The provision on disclosing client fraud was added to the Model
Code before it was adopted by the ABA, apparently to respond to public criticism on the omission of
the duty found in the Canons.
79. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.3 (1986).
80. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1980).
81.

See supra note 22.
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The ABA policy statement was more than an expression of the bar's
interpretation of the law-more than an extrajudicial brief intended as
argument to the district court that was to hear the NationalStudent Marketing case. The statement was a challenge to that court's power to articulate the law and a warning that the court should stay out. The
statement asserted,
[A]ny principle of law which except as permitted or required by the
[Model Code], permits or obliges a lawyer to disclose to the S.E.C.
otherwise confidential information should be established only by statute after full and careful consideration of the public interests
involved
82
and should be resisted unless clearly mandated by law.
The ABA statement was not explicit on which "principles of law"
lawyers might obey as "clearly mandated by law" and which they should
resist as somehow not law. The last paragraph of the statement, however, suggested that a pro-SEC decision from the court in NationalStudent Marketing would fall in the "resist" category as not-quite law. The
last paragraph bemoaned the possibility that lawyers might be deterred
from fulfilling their ethical obligations to their clients by an "erroneous
position of the SEC or a questionable lower court decision."83 Thus, the
bar was not merely making an argument to the lower court on the merits
or on the court's jurisdiction to decide the dispute; the bar was insisting
on its right to reject as not law any pro-SEC, prodisclosure opinion from
the National Student Marketing court. The last paragraph acknowledged that such a court opinion might influence the conduct of lawyers
because lawyers might be frightened by what other courts or the SEC
might do to them. That is different, however-fundamentally differentfrom an acknowledgment by the bar that such a decision would be "law"
that lawyers should respect and obey. The bar was insisting on its right
to live out its own law without court approval and in opposition to court
attempts to articulate a contrary law.
After the NationalStudent Marketing court weakly endorsed some
amorphous form of the SEC's position, the bar again reacted. The ABA
amended the above-quoted ethics rule, adding the language "except if
privileged" to the end of it."* The ABA's ethics committee then issued
an opinion that interpreted the amendment to mandate silence in the face
82. ABA Policy on Securities Matters, supra note 74, at 1086 (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-02(B)(1) (1981).
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Moreover, the ethics opinion made clear that this read-

ing reaffirmed the law as the bar had long understood it and to which the
86
bar remained committed.

So much for the little law the court had managed to articulate: that
lawyers had a duty "to take steps to ensure that information [will] be
disclosed to the shareholders."8 " By amending the ethics code and issu-

ing the nondisclosure ethics opinion, the ABA was insisting that its law
had not

changed,

the SEC's action

and the court's

opinion

notwithstanding.
Most state courts refused to accept the ABA's amendment or its
ethics opinion asserting the bar's law of nondisclosure. The state courts,

by and large, adhered to the old formulation of the ethics rule.88 The law
affirmed by the bar was thus not merely at odds with that affirmed by
some mad-dog agency officials and one lower district court; it was also at

odds with the law affirmed by the majority of state supreme courts.
Undaunted, the bar continued to insist on its view.
In the early 1980s, the ABA decided to update the Model Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility. 9 The ABA commission charged to do this
surveyed existing state ethics codes adopted by the state supreme courts
and noted that most state courts adhered to a disclosure-of-fraud rule. 90
The commission proposed including a scaled-down version of existing
state law in the new ethics code. It proposed giving a lawyer the discretion to disclose substantial fraud in which the lawyer's services had been
used.9 1 Notice that this proposal was substantially narrower than
85. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
86. Id. Opinion 341 explained,
The conflicting duties to reveal fraud and to preserve confidences have existed side-by-side
for some time.
However, it is clear that there has long been an accommodation in favor of preserving
confidences either through practice or interpretation. Through the Bar's interpretationin
practice of its responsibility to preserve confidences and secrets of clients, and through its
interpretations like Formal Opinion 287, significant exceptions to any general duty to
reveal fraud have been long accepted. Apparently, the exceptions were so broad or the
policy underlying the duty to reveal so weak that the earlier drafts of the Code of Professional Responsibility omitted altogether the concept [of revealing client fraud].
Id. (emphasis added) (referring to the omission of a duty to reveal fraud from the preliminary draft
of the Model Code). See supra note 78.
87. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978).
88. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional
Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 294 n.38 (1984) (explaining that as of 1983, when the ABA adopted a
new ethics code, only 14 states had adopted the amended version of DR 7-102(B)(1)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (Final Draft 1981), reprintedin
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1981, app.
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existing state law. 92 Lawyers were nonetheless outraged.9 3 Their law
included no such duty, and they were not going to accept such a duty
merely because state courts seemed to embrace some such idea of the
law. The ABA House of Delegates amended the commission's draft of
the ethics rules, eliminating the heretical discretion-to-disclose-fraud
rule.9 4 The state courts put it back in. 9'
At this point in my story, I want to move back in time in order to
move forward. While the ABA commission was drafting the Model
Rules, the New York Times Magazine published an article on the lawyers
who had represented O.P.M.-a company involved in widespread
fraud. 96 The article asked the question Judge Sporkin was to pose years
later when faced with the Lincoln Savings and Loan fraud: "Where were
the lawyers?" 97 The fraud perpetrated by the O.P.M. group involved
sums of money that at the time seemed considerable but which pale next
to the S&L frauds of our time. But on another measure-the number of
sophisticated players taken in-the O.P.M. fraud retains its status as one
of the biggies, having snared, entangled, or hoodwinked such notables as

Rockwell International, American Express, Chase Manhattan Bank, and
98
Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb.
O.P.M.'s lawyers claimed that for a decade they were unaware of
their client's fraudulent doings. According to the lawyers, they learned
of the fraud in June 1980, when O.P.M.'s executive vice president confessed to the law firm that O.P.M. was engaged in large-scale fraud. The
law firm then sought advice on its obligations from two legal ethics
experts. These experts gave O.P.M.'s lawyers "the advice they wanted to
hear": 99
92. Unlike the Code as it existed in most states, the draft of the Model Rules made no mention
of disclosure to comply with other law, court orders, or other ethics rules. It limited the lawyer's
discretion to revealing the client's intent to commit a crime, allowing such discretion only for serious
crimes against persons or property. And instead of requiring lawyers to reveal client fraud committed against a third party with the lawyer's services, the draft allowed lawyers to reveal such fraud.
93. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 145 (3d ed.
1989); Hazard, supra note 88, at 287.
94.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1991).

2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 1259-66
(2d ed. 1991) (charting the states' changes to model rule 1.6).
96. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 31.
97. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) ("Where...
were the accountants and attorneys when these transactions were effectuated?").
98. HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 43, at 255.
99. Taylor, supra note 96, at 46.
95.
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Singer Hutner [O.P.M.'s law firm] could ethically continue to represent O.P.M., giving the benefit of the doubt to [the client's] assurances
that there was no ongoing fraud. The firm could continue to close new
loans for O.P.M. pending efforts to find out details of [O.P.M.'s] past
wrongdoing .

. .

. Singer Hutner was bound to keep everything it

learned secret ....
It was not necessary... for Singer Hutner to check the authenticity of ... documents [that purported to show that O.P.M. had the
security to repay the loans] . . . provided to banks to obtain loans

[other than by conversation with the client] before closing the new
loans. As to the possibly false opinion letters and documents the firm
had unwittingly provided to banks to obtain loans for O.P.M. [that
were still outstanding] ...

Singer Hutner had no legal duty to with-

draw them. [The ethics expert] reasoned that leaving the victims of a
past fraud in the dark was not an ongoing fraud....
[As to frauds the client might commit in the future using the lawyers' services] O.P.M. should be required to certify in writing [to
m°
Singer Hutner] the legitimacy of each new transaction.
In essence, the advice was that the lawyers had no obligation to
withdraw lawyer-prepared documents that the lawyers now knew were
materially misleading, even though the banks continued to rely on these
documents. The advice was that the lawyers' duty of confidentiality prevented disclosure of the client's use of the lawyers' services to commit
fraud. The advice was that the lawyers were entitled to believe their client was not committing fraud so long as the client was willing to assure
the lawyers that no fraud was being committed. A lawyer who believed
his client, despite the recklessness of that belief, was justified in helping
that client win the trust of others. Singer Hutner followed this advice
and in doing so helped the client commit more fraud. O.P.M. ultimately
admitted to the firm that despite its assurances to the contrary, it had
continued to lie to the lawyers and everyone else and had continued to
use the lawyers to close fraudulent deals. The law firm finally resigned.
At the time the firm resigned, O.P.M. had between $80 million and
$90 million in fraudulent loans outstandingl 0 1-loans secured with the
law firm's help. Nonetheless, the firm did not disclose anything to those
who had been defrauded and whose money was at risk."°2 In passing the
case on to successor counsel, Singer Hutner reportedly followed the
experts' advice once again. It did not tell O.P.M.'s new lawyers of the
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 49.
Id.
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client's use of its former lawyers to commit fraud.10 3 As a result,
O.P.M.'s new lawyers closed at least one fraudulent deal for O.P.M.
before the fraud was discovered by the victims and reported to federal
authorities."° The bankruptcy trustee for O.P.M. wrote,
Viewed as a whole, the Trustee finds Singer Hutner's conduct nothing
short of shocking .... Although Singer Hutner cites its ethical obligations ...the most questionable aspects of Singer Hutner's conduct
raise issues beyond professional ethics. Even after learning that
[O.P.M.'s manager] had engaged in major wrongdoing, Singer Hutner
continued to close O.P.M. debt financings without obtaining prior disclosure of the nature of the wrongdoing and without independently
verifying transaction facts. No rule ofprofessional ethics can or should
exempt lawyersfrom the general legalproscriptionagainstwillful blindness to their clients' crimes or reckless participationin them.10 5
Notice the trustee's affirmation of the state's hierarchy of norms:
Other laws trump the ethics rules. the "expert" advice provided to
Singer Hutner reflected another hierarchy, one that placed the lawyer's
duties to the client and the client's confidences first.
Those who had loaned money to O.P.M. sued Singer Hutner, charging that the firm had become an accomplice to its client's fraud. Singer
Hutner settled, reportedly agreeing to pay $10 million, still insisting that
it had acted in accordance with the law 1° 6 -a law, that is, that places
ethical obligations as they are understood by the bar above other legal
obligations. "Lawyers," the firm maintained in a brief filed on its behalf,
"are not ordinary people: they are sometimes duty-bound to stand up for
and protect liars and thieves."' 7 Singer Hutner thought this was one of
those times. Kaye, Scholer made a similar argument to justify its conduct toward the bank regulators in representing Lincoln Savings and
Loan.
The ABA delegates who voted for the no-disclosure-of-fraud rule
were aware of the criticism of Singer Hutner's conduct in representing
O.P.M.'0
After the ABA vote, one of O.P.M.'s former lawyers
"received several congratulatory calls from fellow lawyers, celebrating
103. Id.
104. Id. Report of the Trustee, In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., 28 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983), reprinted(in condensedform) in HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 43, at 255.
105. Id.
106. Taylor, supra note 96, at 52.
107. Id.
108. The trustee's report had been filed. The New York Times article, among other reports, had
appeared.
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the ABA's vindication of his decision not to blow the whistle on the
scams his firm had been helping."" 9 The ABA knew what it was doing.
It was reaffirming its law. The message sent to lawyers was unmistakable: We stand by liars and thieves, not just in court, but outside of it as
well, and we keep our mouth shut. Kaye, Scholer and its partner Peter
Fishbein undoubtedly heard this message. They had, after all, a special
reason to be interested in what the ABA had to say about Singer
Hutner's silence. Kaye, Scholer and Fishbein had been Singer Hutner's
successors in representing O.P.M. End of rabbit trail.
The final version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
adopted by the ABA included an "out" for the lawyer who discovers,
while third parties are still relying on the lawyer's representations, that
the client has been committing fraud with the lawyer's unwitting assistance and that representations made by the lawyer are false. The lawyer
needs an "out" from the "ethical" obligation of silence because the lawyer may be liable under criminal law for recklessly having made these
statements' 10 and under civil law for negligently having made such statements. 11 ' Alerting third parties not to rely on the statements may undercut claims that the lawyer was reckless or negligent in initially issuing the
statements.112 The "out" is that the lawyer can engage in noisy withdrawal: resigning from the representation while disaffirming outstanding
13
documents or representations."
This "out," however, should not be mistaken for an admission by
the bar that other law trumps bar law. It is not. First, the "out" is
buried in a comment, which suggests that it should be relied on only in
the most urgent of cases, because the lawyer who relies on a comment
does so at some risk." 4 Second, a signal indicating that the client has
engaged in fraud may be the same as outright disclosure from the perspective of the client and from that of the victim of fraud, assuming she
understands the signal. But signaling and speaking are readily distinguishable activities for the person who must engage in one as opposed to
the other. Being forced to communicate in an unnatural and indirect
109. Hazard, supra note 88, at 306.
110. See United States v. Benjamin, 338 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1964).
111. See Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987).
112. See, eg., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1991) ("If as the investors
submit [the lawyer] came to doubt the representations in his letter but continued to allow its circulation, this may be powerful evidence of recklessness, and so establish liability under § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.").
113. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1991).
114. According to the Model Rules, "Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide
guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules." Id. Scope 9 (1991).
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manner reinforces the norm of confidentiality at the moment the bar's
law allows the lawyer to escape from it. Such is the expressive power of
law-the expressive power of the comment to rule 1.6: A norm may be
reinforced by an exception. The comment represents an accommodation
to state law: It allows the lawyer who fears'I 5 tort or criminal liability for
the client's wrongs an "out" from the dictates of silence. At the same
time, the comment's insistence on signs communicates that silence is
right and disclosure is wrong. It bows to the force of state law but rejects
its legitimacy.
The "out" was not enough for most state courts. Most state
supreme courts rewrote model rule 1.6 to restore some duty to disclose
client fraud, at least when the lawyer's services had been used to perpetrate the fraud.1 16 By rejecting the bar's version of rule 1.6, the state
supreme courts affirmed the state's understanding of the law governing
lawyers. Again, the bar did not respond by conceding. Despite state
court rejection of rule 1.6, the ABA refused to amend it. In 1991 the
ABA rejected a proposal to rewrite rule 1.6 to allow a lawyer to reveal
confidential information to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal
or fraudulent act in which the lawyer's services had been used. 117 Proponents of the amendment argued that the change was necessary because
rule 1.6 "threaten[s] to unfairly subject lawyers to potential civil liability
and criminal prosecution.""' 8 The ABA was thus aware of the divergence between its law and state law, but it chose to fight on.
There are those who insist on portraying the ABA's actions in this
struggle with the state as acts of advocacy only."I9 In this view, the bar's
adoption of policy statements, the amendment and proposal of ethics
rules, and the issuance of ethics opinions are the bar's attempts to persuade courts to accept its understanding of law and not an attempt to
115. The lawyer who faces such charges as opposed to fearing them is allowed to disclose confidences as a matter of self-defense, according to both the bar and the state. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (b)(2) (1991).
116. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 95, app. 4 at 1259-66.
117. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 11 (1991) (rejecting the amendment by a standing vote of 251158).
118. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2 (1991).
119. In conversation and correspondence several of my colleagues in legal ethics have expressed
this view to me. But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and ClientFraud: They Still Don't Get It,
6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 1993) (accepting that the bar maintains its own normative
vision at odds with the state but questioning whether the bar understands the implications of its
vision). I believe that part of what is going on here is advocacy. However, as I explain in the text, I
do not believe that the advocacy explanation is sufficient.
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affirm its own law free of court domination. This explanation does not
work. To describe the ABA's stance as advocacy suggests that the bar
accepts that the courts, not the bar, have the ultimate say on what is
right. The bar may accept that the courts have the power to insist on a
particular vision of law, but that is different from acknowledging that
court interpretations are authoritative interpretations of law that lawyers
are bound to respect.
When confronted with court law contrary to bar law, the bar often
takes the position that a lawyer may ethically comply with the court but
is not required to do so. 20 Consider the ABA's statement on a lawyer's
obligations when faced with a court order to disclose what the bar considers to be confidential information:
If the motion to quash is denied, the lawyer must either testify or run
the risk of being held in contempt.... The lawyer has an ethical duty
to preserve client confidences and to test any interference with that
duty in court. If a contempt citation is upheld on appeal, however, the
lawyer has little choice but to testify or go to jail. Both the Model
Rules and the Model Code recognize that a lawyer's ethical
duty to
12
preserve client confidences gives way to final court orders. 1
Bar law "gives way" not to lower court orders but to appellate court
orders. Moreover, bar law "gives way" to appellate court orders not
because the courts have the final say on what is a confidence and whether
it must be revealed, but because an appellate court is likely to use force:
"the lawyer has little choice but to testify or go to jail." Standard state
doctrine, of course, gives a lower court the right to use force to back its
interpretations even if the lower court orders are later adjudged by a
higher court to be unconstitutional. 2 ' The bar, however, understands
that the courts are reluctant to use force against lawyers. This reluctance
allows the bar to advise lawyers to resist lower court opinions with relative impunity. The bar also recognizes that appellate court orders are
another matter. But granting lawyers permission to give in to court pronouncements when faced with the prospect of jail is far from acknowledging that those court pronouncements are interpretations that the
lawyer must accept as law. The bar's position does not acknowledge
120. See, e.g., Alabama State Bar, Op. 88-76 (1988), summarized in ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 88-76 (1988) (stating that "if ordered to testify by the
court, the lawyer may either do so or may seek appellate relief"); Virginia State Bar, Op. 787 (1986)
(stating that lawyers may testify only after a motion to quash has been denied). See Koniak, supra
note 7, at 1420-22 (discussing such opinions).
121. Discosure. Lawyers Subpoenas, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 55, at
1301, 1307 (Oct. 25, 1989).
122. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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appellate opinions as law; rather, it acknowledges them as signaling the
imminent use of force. There is a difference.
This difference may be seen in the bar's attitude toward the reach of
court opinions that contradict the bar's law. Ethics opinions advising
lawyers what to do when faced with state law that appears to require
disclosure or some other infidelity to the client suggest that a lawyer is
free to ignore the weight of court authority. They do not require lawyers
to check controlling precedent in the relevant jurisdiction or other jurisdictions before deciding whether to obey legislation or court orders
requiring disclosure of client confidences. 1 23 To the contrary, these opinions encourage lawyers to ignore precedent. For example, numerous ethics opinions counsel lawyers to resist disclosure of client identity and the
fees paid to the lawyer by the client. 124 Given the overwhelming number
of court decisions asserting that such matters are not privileged, 125 these
ethics opinions demonstrate that the bar's commitment to resisting court
authority is deep. Court decisions contrary to bar law, no matter how
numerous, do not establish law that all lawyers are bound to obey. The
bar's attitude is that those cases at most resolved the conflicts actually
before those courts. The lawyers involved had to give in or go to jail.
Other lawyers, however, may continue to adhere to the bar's divergent
interpretation of law.
This posture toward court law "is an attempt to separate completely
the projection of understanding from the decree that is the direct exercise
of power. Such separation allows one to 'acquiesce' by refraining from
resistance while simultaneously refusing to extend the social range of the
123. I have found no bar opinion stating that a lawyer should consider the relevant authority in
the jurisdiction in deciding whether he or she may defy a court order requiring disclosure of client
confidences. Some opinions emphasize that the lawyer's right to disobey a trial court order is dependent on the lawyer's ability to make a "good faith argument," but the bar's understanding of that
concept is quite broad. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 &
n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). I have found no bar opinion suggesting that a good faith argument must be
found in existing precedent in that jurisdiction.
124. See, eg., State Bar of Ga., Advisory Op. 41 (1984) (stating that lawyers should pursue all
reasonable avenues of appeal before complying with such requests from state agencies); State Bar of
Wis., Formal Op. E-90-3 (1990) (stating that lawyers should not disclose when faced with an IRS
summons but noting that "ultimately, if the lawyer is judicially ordered to disclose the client's identity, the lawyer must make a personal decision whether to risk a finding of contempt in order to
obtain appellate review of the matter).
125. See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Haddad, 527 F.2d 537, 538-39 (6th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). See generally EDWARD
W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 90 (3d ed. 1984) (explaining the general rule that fees
and identity are not privileged information). The courts agree that exceptions to this general rule are
rare. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Hirsch), 803 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1986).

1993]

WHEN COURTS REFUSE TO FRAME LAW

1103

Court's hermeneutic."' 26 Whether this move succeeds is a function of
how committed courts are to insisting on their understanding of law.
The more willing courts are to sanction lawyers for acting on interpretations that are contrary to court interpretations, the less likely lawyers are
to ignore existing precedent. Ultimately, courts have the power to insist
that their interpretations are projected into the future; they can issue
injunctions. But the likelihood of courts issuing injunctions against lawyers is remote given the weak posture typically assumed by courts that
find themselves at odds with the bar. The bar's divergent vision thus has
been able to flourish, and the job of killing bar law has been left to nonjudicial state actors, such as officials of the OTS. The use of power by nonjudicial state actors has escalated.1 27 No doubt this escalation has been
fueled in part by the perception of these officials that, given a choice, the
bar would rather fight than switch-the perception that when confidentiality is involved, the bar accommodates power and nothing else.
This brings us to the question of how the bar's attitude toward court
law has contributed to the use of state power that the bar now laments.
It is easier to maintain one's own law when the other side is not likely to
get too nasty. It appears the other side has figured this out. It is simply
too late for the bar to claim that strong action need not be taken against
lawyers-too late to argue that the bar takes state interpretations, even
when articulated by a court, seriously apart from the power behind those
interpretations. The state seems to have finally appreciated that the only
interpretations the bar takes seriously are its own. The OTS action can
be understood as a warning that the state understands that the bar
respects the state's power and little else. My claim is that the bar in a
very real sense asked for this, and the OTS obliged.
Now the bar speaks not of its law, but of the need for "court process." 128 Now the bar speaks not of the legitimacy of living out the law
to which one is committed, but of the need to submit to court resolution.
Now the bar cries foul, but the power of the critique is lost. He who lives
by the sword ....
126. Cover, supra note 32, at 54 n.146.
127. The OTS is not the only agency to assume a more aggressive posture. Recently the SEC
has also signaled its intention to push its vision of law more vigorously. See In re Kern, Exchange
Act Release No. 29,356, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815 (June 21, 1991)
(announcing the SEC's intent to renew its efforts to discipline securities lawyers who aid their clients'
securities fraud).
128. See, e.g., ABCNY REPORT ON ATTACHMENT, supra note 60 (arguing for prior judicial
approval of freeze orders against lawyers and asserting no position on what a lawyer's obligations
should be when faced with a client who commits fraud).
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CAN INSISTING ON ONE'S OWN LAW BE BOTH
TYRANNY AND ETHICS?

When the OTS uses its power to freeze assets in the name of principles it calls "well established" and thereby forces a change in how lawyers behave, the OTS in some sense has made law without a court. When
the bar advises lawyers that it is their ethical obligation to keep client
confidences in situations where court law suggests otherwise and lawyers
behave in accordance with the bar's advice, the bar in some sense has
made law without a court. Can it be the profession's highest calling for
the bar to insist on its own law1 29 and tyranny when state actors so insist?
Let's start with whether it is appropriate to call this behavior tyranny
when engaged in by the state.
Tyranny is the reduction of law to force. The state has a significant,
if imperfect, monopoly on violence. This monopoly is rendered legitimate by the promise that that violence will be used only in accordance
with law. That promise is empty when law is reduced to the invocation
of force. For the promise to have meaning we must have some way of
distinguishing law from the mere invocation of force, some way to ensure
that the invocation of force accords with principles that we affirm. Our
society entrusts the courts with the final say on the meaning of law and
on whether the use of state power is legitimate-lawful. 3 The government blurs the separation between force and meaning when it uses violence to create law through processes that make court affirmation of that
law difficult, unlikely, or impossible. Each step in this direction
approaches tyranny.
The charge against the freeze order used by the OTS is that the
order allows the state to reduce law to the exertion of force. Whether
that happened in the Kaye, Scholer incident-that is, whether Kaye,
Scholer settled because of the cease-and-desist order or for other reasons-is less important than the point that the freeze power risks reducing law to the exertion of force. But do freeze orders actually obstruct a
court's ability to affirm meaning more significantly than other accepted
government tools?
For example, Kaye, Scholer's lawyer, among others, has suggested
that the most unfair aspect of the action against Kaye, Scholer was that
129. See, e.g., State Bar of N.M., Advisory Op. 1989-2 (1989) (insisting that a lawyer should not
disclose information to the IRS under 26 U.S.C. § 60501 but should withdraw or continue the representation and resist disclosure, which would be "consistent with the highest ideals of the
profession").
130. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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the OTS had the power both to bring charges and to decide whether
those charges were valid in the first instance.13 1 Other administrative
agencies have the power to judge the merits of actions brought by agency
personnel.1 32 Concentrating these powers in administrative agencies is, in
fact, commonplace. Nonetheless, as others have pointed out, this commonplace practice is troubling 133 because allowing state actors to bring
charges, to try a defendant, and to render a "verdict" provides those
actors with the power to insist on a legal vision that courts might not
ratify; defendants might be coerced to give in when faced with this concentration of power.
131. 8 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 7, at 109, 119 (May 6, 1992) (quoting
Bernard Nussbaum, Kaye, Scholer's lawyer, describing this concentration of power in the OTS as
setting up "a kangaroo court and a kangaroo judge."). See also Pitt & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1
(asserting that while the freeze order has received the most attention from commentators, "the most
noteworthy facet" of the action against Kaye, Scholer was the "administrative absolutism" of
allowing the OTS to function as judge of its own cause).
132. See Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative
Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 969-70 (1991) (describing the structure of traditional regulatory agencies, like the SEC and FTC, in which agency heads act as final adjudicators for
the cases that the agency staff has investigated and prosecuted). Under the Administrative Procedures Act, "ALJs are subordinate to the employing agency: the agency can review an ALJ's initial
decision or even dispense with the ALJ and adjudicate by itself. When reviewing ALl decisions, the
agency may exercise full powers over the dispute as if it were deciding the case de novo." Ronald A.
Cass, Models ofAdministrativeAction, 72 VA. L. REV. 363, 381-82 (1986) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(b),
557(b) (1982)). The APA directs that ALJs must not be "subject to the supervision or direction of
an employee engaged in prosecutorial or investigative functions," but empirical evidence suggests
that agencies nonetheless benefit from what Professor Coffee has called the "home court advantage"
of having disputes resolved before in-house judges. John C. Coffee, ParadigmsLost: The Blurring of
the CriminalandCivil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1887-88
(1992) (citing ABA Task Force Survey Finds ALJs Almost Always Uphold SEC Charges, Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1531 (Oct. 13, 1989)). Cf Ronald A. Cass, Allocation ofAuthority Within
Bureaucracies:Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1986) (discussing
delegation of decision-making authority by agency heads to independent review boards and other,
less formally structured entities).
133. For example, in 1970, Philip Elman, a former FTC Commissioner, stated, "[T]he strongest
argument I would make against agency adjudication of alleged violations of law is that the blending
of prosecutorial and adjudicative powers in a single tribunal imposes intolerable strains on fairness."
Philip Elman, A Modest Proposalfor RadicalReform, 56 A.B.A. J. 1045, 1048 (1970); see also Baxter, supra note 64, at 240-42 (suggesting procedural modifications in the structure of agencies that
regulate the banking industry, including more separation between prosecutorial and adjudicatory
personnel); Louis Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commission, 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960) (arguing that agency adjudicatory functions should be assigned to a separate
adjudicatory body); Newton Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 14
ADMIN. L. REV. 146 (1963) (arguing that agency adjudicatory functions should be more clearly
separated from and independent of enforcement and policy personnel); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DuKE L.J. 257 (proposing, inter alia, that the
enforcement functions of administrative agencies be assigned to the executive department of the
government).
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But once again one must ask whether this concentration of power,
subject as it is to court review on appeal, actually obstructs a court's
ability to affirm meaning more significantly than other even more commonplace government tools. For example, what of the government's
power to bring charges or to file a complaint in court? There are those
who argue that it was the complaint claiming $275 million that "forced"
Kaye, Scholer to settle, not the freeze order or the concentration of
power in the OTS.' 34 These people argue persuasively that the pressure
put on Kaye, Scholer by its banks to settle-pressure in the form of "no
more credit" threats-would have been present without the freeze order
(and whether the hearing was to be before the agency or a court). Not
many law firms would seem creditworthy when facing potential liability
of $275 million.
If, as I tend to believe, it was the complaint that "forced" Kaye,
Scholer to settle and not the freeze order or the concentration of power in
the OTS, is the question of "tyranny" moot? After all, we all accept the
government's power to bring charges. Is it my position that such a commonplace and necessary power may approach tyranny by reducing law
to power? Yes, and our law reflects that understanding. Consider, for
example, the institution of the grand jury, 135 the right to bail, 136 the
arraignment process, preliminary hearings, the constitutional limits on
prosecutorial discretion, 137 and, on the civil side, rule I l's guarantee of
sanctions for frivolous filings.' 38 Consider too the doctrine of void for
vagueness, to which I alluded earlier in discussing the "unsafe and
unsound" language of FIRREA.' 39 This doctrine is another means of
ensuring the separation between law and force. It says that law that the
state can claim means just about anything is not law.
In recent years the Supreme Court has shown little interest in bolstering institutions like the grand jury that are designed to check the
government's ability to transform force into law."4 That problem, however, should have commanded the bar's attention long before the Kaye,
134. Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, How a Big Law Firm Was Brought to Knees by Zealous
Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al (discussing bank concerns about Kaye, Scholer's
ultimate liability, which prompted the settlement).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
136. U.S. CONT. amend. VIII.
137. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ch.
21 (3d ed. 1992).
138.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

139. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992) (holding that the government
may suppress exculpatory evidence in grand jury proceedings without violating the Constitution);
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Scholer incident.14 The bar proclaims that its independence from the
state is necessary to ensure the liberty of all citizens. Sadly, it seems that
the bar has a keen eye for the approach of tyranny when lawyers are
threatened with power but is blind when the threat is to those much less
capable of standing up to the state than Peter Fishbein or his compatriots
at Kaye, Scholer.
Where was the bar when Bordenkircherv. Hayes142 was decided? 1
In Bordenkircher the Supreme Court approved the following
prosecutorial conduct: The prosecutor told the defendant that if he pled
guilty to forging an $88.30 check, a crime punishable by two to ten years
imprisonment, the prosecutor would recommend a five-year sentence.
On the other hand, the prosecutor explained that if Hayes refused to
plead guilty, the government would indict him under a repeat offender
statute, which carried a mandatory life sentence. Broad agency discretion to freeze a defendant's assets prior to trial narrows the gap between
law and force, but its potential to reduce law to force pales in comparison
United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992) (holding that district courts may not dismiss an
otherwise valid indictment because the government failed to disclose to the grand jury substantial
exculpatory evidence in its possession); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990)
(holding that the government's violation of the Bail Reform Act's requirement of a prompt adversary hearing does not require release of a person whom a court later finds would have been subject to
detention had the government followed the law); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250
(1988) (holding that a district court may not generally seek to deter prosecutorial misconduct by
dismissing an indictment secured through such tactics as the knowing presentation of misinformation and the mistreatment of witnesses; rather, the defendant must show prejudice); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that the Bail Reform Act, which allows the government to
detain people prior to trial without bail upon demonstrating that the presumably innocent person is
dangerous to the community, is constitutional); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)
(upholding the validity of agreements between the government and a suspect in which the government will dismiss charges against the suspect in exchange for the suspect's promise not to sue the
government for violating his or her constitutional rights); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985) (assuming a very deferential stance to reviewing accusations of selective prosecution). But cf.
Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992) (holding that the government's eight-and-a-halfyear delay in proceeding to trial violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial); Burns v. Reed, 111
S. Ct. 1934 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune from liability for legal advice
given to the police-here, advice that questioning a suspect under hypnosis was legal). The lack of
concern by the Court for these institutions may perhaps be gauged by noting that four Justices were
prepared to ignore the eight-and-a-half-year delay in Doggett.
141. The bar did file amici briefs in a few of the cases cited supra note 140. For example, in the
1987 Salerno decision both the ABA and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
filed amici briefs. NACDL also filed an amicus brief in Bank of Nova Scotia. But these sporadic
efforts cannot compare with the attention the NationalStudent Marketing complaint received, or the
attention being given to the Kaye, Scholer incident.
142. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
143. No bar group filed an amicus brief in this case, nor was the bar heard in Wayte, 470 U.S. at
598, in which the Court held that court supervision of the prosecutor's decision to charge someone
with a crime should be minimal to nonexistent.
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to Bordenkircher-stylebargaining.'" The bar has not, however, risen in
outrage against the holding of Bordenkircher. Recently, the Supreme

Court held that the admission of a coerced confession may constitute
harmless error as long as the coercion was not too extreme. 145 Further,
the Court announced that various forms of prosecutorial misconduct are
too inconsequential to warrant severe court sanctions. 146 The bar's voice
can barely be heard on these matters: Apparently, we reserve our strongest protests for ourselves.
The bar is heard on the subpoenaing of lawyers before grand juries
(a practice mostly aimed at getting information about fees paid to attorneys), 1 4 7 on the failure to exempt attorneys' fees from pretrial freezing of
assets under RICO and similar statutes,148 and now on the Kaye, Scholer
matter. 149 When lawyers are involved, the bar can see potential tyranny
and is heard. Lawyers, schooled in the law and richer than ordinary
citizens, are, however, in a much better position to resist the state than
are people like Hayes. The bar should be ashamed of its selective sensitivity to "tyranny.' 150 Our voices need to be heard for others.
On to the second half of the question I posed: Can action constitute
tyranny when engaged in by the state but reflect nobility when engaged
in by the bar? In general, I believe that society benefits when private
groups have the right to demonstrate strong commitments to alternative
visions of law without prior state approval. I believe in civil disobedience. Committed group opposition to "official" law forces the state to
144. Professor Coffee's criticism of the OTS' action against Kaye, Scholer captured the thrust of
the criticism of the OTS offered by most lawyers: "The outcome in Kaye, Scholer resembles a plea
bargain in which a prosecutor has brought overwhelming pressure to bear. As a result, the guilt or
innocence of the defendants remains debatable, and the substantive legal standards that are applicable remain unclarified." Coffee, supra note 60, at 22.
True enough, but the real thing (Bordenkircher)is much more troubling than its pale cousin.
145. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991).
146. See cases cited supra note 140.
147. Kathleen Brickey, Tainted Assets & the Right to Counsel-The Money Laundering Conundrum, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 47-49 (1988).
148. Id.
149. The bar has also been quite active in fighting the breadth of RICO, a statute whose breadth
has swept into its net some of the bar's best-paying clients. Id. Again, our collective voice seems to
follow our fees. It is one thing for individual lawyers to be hired guns. It is quite another for the bar
as an institution to behave in this manner.
150. I am not oblivious to the argument that protecting lawyers from the state is the key to
protecting the liberty of all. I am just cynical about it. Given that most individual legal services are
distributed in this country on a you-get-what-you-can-pay-for basis, concentrating group efforts on
protecting lawyers (or well-paying clients) guarantees the liberty of those wealthy enough to pay for
the services of these individual champions. The system we tolerate for the distribution of individual
legal services places a greater responsibility on the group as a whole to speak out on the use of state
power against those least able to afford such services.
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reexamine its commitments and forces state actors, including judges, to
consider the meaning and rightness of official doctrine: Are they sure
enough to place all these bodies in jail? Gandhi taught the world the
power of action in the name of another vision of "right." Such action has
the power to move society to better worlds. It is, however, risky. The
"wrong" side can win if not enough people care or if we choose sides
unwisely. How to determine the right side is a question surely outside
the scope of this Article, but it is my claim that society benefits from
having alternatives put before it. Watching others live a law opposed to
our own encourages us to ask ourselves whether we should do the same
and to imagine what might happen if we did. What would that world
look like? I view these questions as important steps to conceptualizing
and building a better world.
Should some groups, like the bar, be disqualified from living out
their own law? In an important sense, this question is empty. The state
can never fully capture the meaning of law. Groups that live the law
must interpret it for themselves. To live the law is to engage in interpretation: to ask what a particular set of norms means in concrete situations.
Applying norms requires the creation of narrative. Narrative is the flesh
of the law, the place where its meaning resides. The stories that give law
meaning, that connect the law to the material worlds of day-to-day existence, will proliferate outside of state control no matter what the "official"
rules say about "one" law for all.151 Narratives will proliferate and provide meaning to official norms whenever people take law seriously. Thus,
the bar will have its own law whether or not the state acknowledges the
bar's right to regulate itself: as long, that is, as lawyers take the law
seriously.
To say that the bar will have its own law as long as lawyers take the
law seriously does not answer two important questions that my story
raises: Is the bar's law on confidentiality better than the state's? And,
assuming that bar law diverges at some point from state law, what attitude should the bar take toward court resolution of the differences?
One must judge a private group's legal vision based on the acts it
justifies. 15 2 In the case of the bar, we must consider the acts of lawyers
that the bar's law justifies. By this standard, I believe the state's vision is
151. See Susan P. Koniak, Whose Law Is It Anyway? 9 YALE J. ON REG. 575, 587-93 (1992)
(discussing how private groups play the central role in creating and maintaining the stories that give
meaning to law).
152. It is not the romance of rebellion that should lead us to look to the law evolved by
social movements and communities. Quite the opposite. Just as it is our distrust for and
recognition of the state as reality that leads us to be constitutionalists with regard to the
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better than the bar's. Too many lawyers seem to live a law that functions
as a justification for aiding clients' fraudulent schemes. A law that suggests that O.P.M.'s lawyers did the right thing demands reform.1 53
According to the state, the lawyer's job in advising clients is to bring
the state's law into contact with the world in which the client lives. To
do this the state acknowledges that the lawyer must know what the client
is up to. The state affirms the confidential relationship between lawyers
and clients as a means to ensure that the client complies with state
law.1 54 The bar's law stretches confidentiality to guarantee the secrets of
lawbreakers who use lawyers to tell others that they are complying with
state law. Reducing a lawyer's obligations in this situation to withdrawal, preferably in silence,1 55 ensures that lawyers will be available to
help people intent on surreptitiously breaking state law. In such a world,
fraud-doers run no risk when they use their lawyer to further their
schemes, except that their lawyer may quit, leaving them to find another
unwitting lawyer.
While I am no statist about state law, I see a fundamental difference
between living an alternative legal vision and lying or helping others lie
about living the state's vision. Living an alternative vision demonstrates
the costs of alternatives, fleshes out these alternatives, and helps us see
where the alternatives might lead us. Lying about the law or helping
another to so lie furthers none of those goals. To help others lie about
the law they live is to help destroy the normative world. This form of
"legal aid" suggests that the normative world is a mere facade for the
"real" world of material goals and the desires that lie beneath. To so
state, so it ought to be our recognition of and distrust for the reality of the power of social
movements that leads us to examine the nomian worlds they create.
Cover, supra note 32, at 68.
153. See Taylor, supra note 96, at 52 ("Whether or not ... [O.P.M.'s] lawyers violated the
ethical code, a basic question remains: Is there not something wrong with a code that can plausibly
be read to justify the extreme lengths to which . . . [this law firm] went to protect its criminal
client?").
154. See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice"). See also United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[A] quid
pro quo is exacted for the attorney-client confidence: the client must not abuse the confidential relation by using it to further a fraudulent or criminal scheme, and as a condition to continued representation, the lawyer is required to advise the client to cease any unlawful activities that the lawyer
perceives are occurring. Law and society consent to the attorney-client privilege on these
preconditions.").
155. See supra text accompanying notes 110-18 (discussing the comment to rule 1.6 on noisy
withdrawal).
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denigrate the normative world-to suggest it is a sham-impoverishes us
all. It risks leaving us with no bridge to a better future.
The bar's attitude toward client fraud is wrong because it undermines all law, not just state law, by ensuring that lawyers are readily
available to those who want to lie about the law they live. This availability risks undermining the normative project of law: constructing a world
built on principles. The bar's divergent understanding is wrong not
because it is divergent. It is wrong because it is essentially unfaithful to
law itself.
But what if the state goes too far? For example, what if the state
insists that legal arguments reflect the state's existing understanding of
doctrine and it sanctions lawyers who argue for the reversal, modification, or extension of state law? Some in the bar see rule 11 as posing just
such a danger.1 56 What if it were the state that sought to undermine the
normative project by short-circuiting the advocacy of alternative visions?
I believe it would then be noble for the bar to resist court articulations. I
believe that even the bar has the right to resist court efforts to resolve
competing normative visions. Why then have I been so harsh on the bar
for insisting on its own law without court approval? Is it simply my
disapproval of the merits of the position the bar has staked out?
The merits have a lot to do with it, which is why I began this discussion by considering the merits of the bar's position. But the merits are
not the whole story.
Earlier I said that the bar "flouted" and "bypassed" court articulations of the law governing lawyers. The key to my concern lies in the
difference between the attitude those words suggest and the attitude of
"resistance." Model rule 1.6 is a good example. Neither the rule nor its
comment acknowledges the tension between the text of the rule and
court law. 57 The bar had two honorable paths to choose between. It
could have explained how the rule actually could be reconciled with state
law, which would have included some explanation of the purpose of the
"out" provided by the comment. Alternatively, it could have asserted
156. See, e.g., Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1338-39 (1986).
157. The comment states, "Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of
interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1992). However, this allusion
to possible tension, including the bar's understanding of the appropriate hierarchy, remains a far cry
from acknowledging existing tension. It neither attempts to reconcile the rule with other law nor
advocate resistance to other law in the name of principle. The comment obscures rather than
enlightens.
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that the rule defied state pronouncements because those pronouncements
were wrong. This would have alerted lawyers (and law students, who are
taught their responsibilities from the rules) of the dangers of following
the text and would have left the choice of resistance to the individual.
Instead, the bar ignored the state's position and buried an "out" in the
comment without explanation. "The trouble with the solution.., is that
some fools may not understand that Rule 1.6 does not mean what it
1 58
seems to mean."'
By flouting court law in this manner, the bar risks creating unwitting martyrs to its vision. This is ignoble. I do not suggest that Peter
Fishbein and Kaye, Scholer were unwitting martyrs. The close connection of the firm to the O.P.M. scandal and the firm's general sophistication belie that conclusion. 159 This, however, does not justify the bar's
approach. The bar's approach to court law is troubling for the same
reason that the bar's stance on the merits is troubling. The bar denigrates the normative world when it fails either to construct a bridge
between its vision of law and the court's vision or to declaim openly the
court's vision in favor of its own. It denigrates the normative world by
ignoring court law without a word about the tension between the bar's
vision and the court's vision.
Lawyers are a heterogeneous group, many say too heterogeneous to
maintain any coherent normative vision."t ° I do not believe this, but I do
understand how difficult it would be for a group as heterogeneous as the
bar, with such weak links between members, to sustain an ethos of open
resistance to an institution such as the courts, which wields such enormous power over the fate of individual group members. In my earlier
work I have suggested that the bar is able to maintain its own vision of
law in large part because the courts are so weakly committed to the
state's vision. 16 Here, I suggest that another factor in the continuation
of the bar's divergent vision is that the bar hides the divergence from
those it asks to live the vision and thus masks its potential costs.
158. Hazard, supra note 88, at 306.
159. 1 have refrained throughout this piece from making a judgment about whether Kaye,
Scholer violated state law. The statement in the text should thus not be read as an accusation of
wrongdoing against the firm or attorney Fishbein. I mean only to suggest that if the firm acted
contrary to state law, as courts view that law, because it believed in the bar's general position on
confidentiality and zealous advocacy, then it is unlikely that the firm was ignorant of the divergence
between the bar's position and other law.
160. See, e-g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 59-83 (1982); Edward 0. Laumann & John P. Heinz, Washington Lawyers
and Others: The Structure of Washington Representation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 465, 476-95 (1985).
161. Koniak, supra note 7, at 1392.
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One needs to ask whether a vision that needs to be hidden to be
maintained is worth maintaining. Moreover, one needs to understand
that the hiding itself is costly. By making fools of those who follow the
bar's path and who are punished by state law that they never saw coming, the bar's approach denigrates the normative project. 162 Hiding the
divergence makes a mockery of a lawyer's honest efforts to comply with
law. It is an approach that is as unfaithful to law as the content of the
vision itself. The seriousness of law and the worthiness of the normative
project provide our group with its purpose. We undermine ourselves
when we undermine law. And that is what we are doing.

162. Speaking of the ABA's adoption of model rule 1.6, Professor Hazard has made a similar
point:
[A]s so often occurs in legislation these days, the parliamentary body can take the high
ground of general principle and leave it to the courts to do the dirty work of interpolating
the necessary qualifications. That may be exemplary legislation by contemporary standards but it is not serious law-making.
Hazard, supra note 88, at 306.

